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Individual Religious Freedom and National Security 
in Europe After September 11 
Silvio Ferrari 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, scholars have written about the “revanche 
de Dieu”1 and the “deprivatization of religion.”2 Many stressed that 
religion, which had been confined to the private sphere of human 
life, was reacquiring an important role in the public sphere of human 
life. Citing as examples Iran under Khomeini, Poland under Walesa, 
and the liberation theologies supporting the revolutionary 
movements in Central and South America, these scholars have 
explained how religion, by “leaving its assigned place in the private 
sphere, had thrust itself into the public arena of moral and political 
contestation . . . challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy 
and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and the 
market economy.”3
Violent conflicts are inevitable when religion enters the public 
arena. Once it became clear what an important role religion could 
play in the public arena, politicians began using religion to motivate 
and mobilize people for political, national, and ethnic struggles. The 
events in the Balkans during the 1990s demonstrated the role 
religion can play when religious divisions overlap with national and 
ethnic differences and also showed how eager religious authorities 
were to exploit religion for political reasons.4
Religiously motivated political struggles provided the foundation 
for religious terrorism to develop. In the past, religion had 
occasionally been a component of political, ethnic, or national 
secular terrorism. In Northern Ireland, religion had been one 
 1. See, e.g., GILLES KEPEL, LA REVANCHE DE DIEU [THE REVENGE OF GOD] (1990). 
 2. See, e.g., JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 3−6 
(1994). The “deprivatization” of religion is the central thesis of Casanova’s work. 
 3. Id. at 3−5. 
 4. See generally RELIGION AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA (Paul Mojzes ed., 1998).  
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component, but rarely the central component, of terrorism.5 
However, in the last ten to twenty years a new breed of terrorist has 
appeared: terrorists who are religiously motivated and kill in the 
name of God.6 In many cases, hope of a supernatural reward makes 
“religious” terrorists indifferent toward their own lives; they are 
prepared to die because they are persuaded God will reward their 
sacrifice with eternal life.7 The most hideous form of violence, 
directed against defenseless civilians, is inextricably related to 
religion. 
Scholars debate whether religion is the true motivation for 
terrorism or whether it is a ploy for recruiting followers and a 
medium by which to amplify the impact of terrorist actions.8 For 
example, scholars debate whether Osama Bin Laden’s agenda is 
actually religious or whether he uses religion to disguise a political 
agenda.9 To fight terrorism, it is essential to understand the 
terrorists’ motivations. But the debate about the motivations of 
terrorist leaders should not make us forget that there are people who 
are convinced it is legitimate, even compulsory, to kill in the name of 
God. This conviction on the part of some religious adherents—that 
religion legitimizes violence—distinguishes modern terrorism and is 
at the crux of how to balance individual religious freedom and 
national security. 
Many important questions have been raised by the post–
September 11 approach to religion and security. Thus, we cannot 
simply argue that religious liberty is an inviolable right or that basic 
human rights can only be enjoyed in a secure environment. Both 
 5. For a general overview of Northern Ireland and of hostilities in Ireland, see 
Northern Ireland, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0108101.html (last visited Mar. 5, 
2004). 
 6. See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (1998); MARK 
JUERGENSMAYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS 
VIOLENCE 87−129 (3d ed. 2003).  
 7. For example, the number and determination of the Palestinian shahid (“martyrs”), 
who perform suicidal terrorist attacks in Israel, has shocked Europeans. Many of them were 
religiously motivated and left messages where the religious motivation of their terrorist act was 
clearly stated. See Jean-François Mayer, Religion et terrorisme: La question des attentats suicides: 
tactique ou théologie? [Religion and Terrorism: The Question of Suicide Attacks: Tactic or 
Theology?] (May 14, 2002), at http://www.religioscope.com/info/articles/009_attacks.htm. 
 8. See Religion and Terrorism: Interview with Dr. Bruce Hoffman (Feb. 22, 2002), at 
http://www.religioscope.com/info/articles/003_Hoffman_terrorism.htm. 
 9. See generally BBC News, Who Is Osama Bin Laden? (Sept. 18, 2001), at 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/155236.stm. 
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statements are correct but are of little help in finding a balance 
between the values of freedom and security. Instead, we must 
determine how we can reconcile religious freedom and national 
security in a way that makes it possible to simultaneously enjoy them 
both. 
I am convinced that, in the long run, religious liberty helps 
develop the integration and tolerance that lie at the foundation of a 
stable and safe society,10 but a democratic society must also ensure 
that religious liberty does not exploit fundamental human rights.11
Religious movements that have threatened public safety and 
security have raised similar concerns in the past two decades, and 
past experience with these types of problems has provided guidance 
in dealing with post–September 11 security issues. Mass suicides (in 
Switzerland, for example) and violence (in Waco, Texas, and 
elsewhere)12 persuaded people that some religions can be evil. 
However, because they believe that some religions can be evil, a few 
European states have overreacted and behaved as though all new and 
nonmainstream religious movements are dangerous sects.13 
Fortunately, a more measured approach is gradually emerging in the 
West,14 where the consensus is that more must be learned about 
 10. This concept was expressed in a speech given by Pope John Paul II on January 13, 
2003: “Believers who feel that their faith is respected and whose communities enjoy juridical 
recognition will work with ever greater conviction in the common project of building up the 
civil society to which they belong.” Pope John Paul II, Address of His Holiness Pope John 
Paul II to the Diplomatic Corps § 7 (Jan. 13, 2003), available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2003/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20030113_ 
diplomatic-corps_en.html. 
 11. The U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief declares in its preamble that “the use of religion or 
belief for ends inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, other relevant instruments 
of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the present Declaration is 
inadmissible.” Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 73d plen. mtg. ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1981), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/ 
a36r055.htm.  
 12. See, e.g., CNN, Mass Suicides in Recent Years (Mar. 27, 1997), at http://www. 
cnn.com/US/9703/27/suicide.list.  
 13. The lists of sects prepared in France and Belgium, which combine truly dangerous 
movements and perfectly legitimate groups, are a good example of this overreaction. For 
France, see generally Vincente Fortier, L’encadrement législatif du phénomène sectaire en 
France, 51 REVUE DE DROIT CANONIQUE 21 (2001); FRANCIS MESSNER, LES “SECTES” ET 
LE DROIT EN FRANCE (1999). For Belgium, see Rik Torfs, Sekten en Recht, 4 COLLATIONES: 
VLAAMS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR THEOLOGIE EN PASTORAAL 385 (1998). 
 14. But this is not yet so in the East. In some countries of Eastern Europe, for example, 
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these “new” religious movements so that generalizations are 
avoided. 
Today’s crisis of balancing religious liberty and national security 
must also be approached with deliberation. An emotional and 
uncontrolled reaction to the events of September 11 could 
reproduce the same scenario that has prevailed in the West during 
the last twenty years, with Islam playing the role that the “new” 
religious movements had previously filled. To avoid repeating 
mistakes, we must consider the events of September 11 rationally by 
(1) assessing the legal provisions that have been taken (or may be 
taken) to reconcile the demands of national security and religious 
liberty,15 and by (2) assessing the impact the events of September 11 
will have on the long-term processes that shape the relationship 
between religion and civil society throughout the West.16
Before starting this analysis, one point should be made clear. 
Religious terrorism is not confined to Muslims; it concerns many 
religions, including Christianity. In the West, however, the debate 
on religion and security primarily focuses on Islam. Some people are 
convinced that Islam is an inherently violent religion.17 I do not 
share this opinion. The Qur’an does not contain more violent 
passages than other sacred books, such as the Bible. During the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Islam was a peaceful religion. 
Today, most Muslims do not support violence. Finally, 
violence⎯both in the past and present⎯is common to the followers 
of other religions. Thus, Islamic terrorism should be studied by 
analyzing Islam’s historical roots, which can explain why some 
Muslim groups justify their violent acts by claiming those acts are the 
result of a religious obligation. The same approach can also help 
explain non-Muslim religious terrorism. By understanding the 
historical roots of religious violence, we may be able to remove the 
social and cultural motivations for terrorism and break the link 
between religion and violence. 
a generalized diffidence toward all “new” religious movements still prevails and provides a 
strong foundation for the enactment of severely restrictive provisions. See generally LAW AND 
RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (Silvio Ferrari et al. eds., 2003). I make use of the 
expression “new religious movements” because there is no better definition, although a 
number of these movements are not new at all. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See William Pfaff, Stop Calling Islam the Enemy, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 5, 2002, at 
6. 
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This Article explores how modern, religiously motivated 
terrorism⎯and in particular, the terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York City on September 11, 2001⎯has affected the 
delicate balance between individual religious liberty and national 
security. In particular, this Article focuses on how new legislation 
intended to protect national security after September 11 threatens 
the religious liberty of nontraditional religions, most notably Islam, 
in Europe. It argues that, while states must pass legislation to protect 
national security, states can temper this new legislation to minimize 
intrusions into religious liberty. Religious organizations themselves, 
however, provide the best hope of spreading the message of 
tolerance and reconciliation that will help ensure an individual’s right 
to practice his or her religion in peace in whatever country he or she 
resides. 
This Article will begin its discussion of the relationship between 
individual religious liberty and national security by first examining 
religion and security after September 11. Part III then discusses legal 
provisions affecting religion. Part IV examines the long-term impact 
that the events of September 11 will have on church-state relations. 
Part V contains a brief conclusion. 
II. RELIGION AND SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
Before September 11, 2001, lawmakers in some European states 
were aware of the emerging link between religion and violence. 
However, the terrorist attack on the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center in New York City changed the balance between security and 
liberty. Religion was identified as one of the forces behind that 
attack. Consequently, post–September 11 enhanced security 
measures have affected religious liberty. National security exigencies 
as a result of the September 11 attack have restricted religious 
freedom in at least three ways: (1) in a general way, in which 
governments create new laws restricting fundamental rights; (2) 
indirectly, in which governments scrutinize religious organizations; 
and (3) directly, in which governments intrude into an 
organization’s religious beliefs. These three new restrictions on 
religious freedom are discussed below. 
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A. Government Creation of New Laws  
Restricting Fundamental Rights 
In response to September 11, many states have enacted, or are in 
the process of enacting, laws restricting fundamental rights: freedom 
of movement, freedom of association, and so on.18 These laws also 
restrict religious liberty. For example, missionary activities in foreign 
countries have become increasingly difficult because of more 
stringent provisions regarding obtaining visas, transferring funds over 
foreign borders, registering foreign organizations, and other related 
conduct. The right to disseminate a religious belief⎯already under 
attack in many countries19⎯has inevitably been affected.20
B. Government Scrutinization of Religious Organizations 
Religious organizations are now scrutinized because some 
terrorist groups use a religious cover to exploit the broad freedom 
many states guarantee to religious organizations. State authorities no 
longer refrain from examining the internal operation of an 
organization simply because it has an alleged religious character; 
state authorities want to be able to ascertain whether a religious 
organization is endangering national security. United States Attorney 
General John Ashcroft acknowledged this changed attitude toward 
 18. For information on the status of anti-terrorism laws in Australia, Canada, the United 
States, France, India, Hong Kong, Japan, and the United Kingdom, see Bob Burton, Proposed 
‘Anti-terrorism’ Law Flouts Rights, ASIA TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at http://www.atimes.com/ 
oceania/DD23Ah01.html; Margaret Ng, Hong Kong: Proposed Anti-terrorism Law: 
Obstructing Rights Through Legislation, HUM. RTS. SOLIDARITY, May 2002, available at 
http://www.ahrchk.net/hrsolid/mainfile.php/2002vol12no03/2221.htm; World Anti-
terrorism Laws, http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorism/terrorism3a.htm (last visited Dec. 
30, 2003). 
 19. Concerning the prohibition of proselytism, see SHARING THE BOOK: RELIGIOUS 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF PROSELYTISM (John Witte Jr. & Richard C. 
Martin eds., 1999); Silvio Ferrari, Globalization, Postmodernism and Proselytism, 1999 FIDES 
ET LIBERTAS 13; Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International 
Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 267 (discussing discrimination in restrictions on 
proselytizing).  
 20. The impact of the September 11 events on religious liberty is not limited to 
missionary activities but extends to many other areas. For example, the rise of the insurance 
costs of religious buildings could consume critical funds and reduce the scope of religious 
activities. See Rachel Pomerance, United States: Jewish Groups Feeling the Pinch After Post-9/11 
Hikes in Insurance (Aug. 14, 2002), at http://www.religioscope.com/articles/2002/ 
015_insurance.htm. 
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religious organizations,21 and a few provisions embodying this new 
attitude have been enacted in the United States22 and other nations. 
More state control over the inner life and organization of religious 
communities is therefore to be expected. 
C. Government Intrusion into Religious Beliefs 
Post–September 11 legal provisions that enhance national 
security threaten to intrude into religious beliefs. There is a need to 
prevent people from considering that violence can be religiously 
justified and to break the bond uniting religion and violence once 
that bond has been established.23 However, the state’s need to 
separate religion and violence also endangers religious belief and 
doctrine. If a religious doctrine advocates the subversion of the state, 
is tainted with intolerance, and opposes the democratic fundamentals 
of civil society, can state authorities require it to be changed and 
enforce this change? Can state authorities outlaw the religious group 
that upholds a subversive doctrine, although no crime has been 
committed? Political parties have been banned on this ground.24 The 
question is whether the same attitude applies to religious 
organizations. 
 21. See Associated Press, Ashcroft: We’ll Watch Religious Groups, (Dec. 2, 2001), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,39924,00.html.  
If a religion is hijacked and used as a cover for killing thousands of Americans, we’re 
interested in that . . . . We will respect the rights of political freedom and religious 
freedom, and we are deeply committed to that. But for so-called terrorists to gather 
over themselves some robe of clericism . . . and claim immunity from being 
observed, people who hijack a religion and make out of it an implement of war will 
not be free from our interest.  
Id. (statement by John Ashcroft). 
 22. The new FBI guidelines widen an agent’s power to monitor religious institutions. 
See Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, FBI Given More Latitude: New Surveillance Rules Remove 
Evidence Hurdle, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at A01. 
 23. It is undeniable that religion can motivate terrorist acts and that violence is an 
integral part of many sacred texts. It is a fact that a number of terrorists regard what they do as 
fulfilling God’s will. We are right, however, to consider the behavior of such people as a 
perversion of religion and to deem such people misled by bad teachers, but we must 
nonetheless acknowledge that many of these terrorists believe they are acting in good faith. 
 24. For a recent example, see the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in the 
case of Refah Partisi [The Welfare Party] v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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III. LEGAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING RELIGION 
Immediately following⎯and, in some cases, prior to⎯September 
11, 2001, a few European states approved laws enhancing national 
security. Some of these laws dealt explicitly with religion. Examining 
these legal provisions provides important insight into the new 
balance between religious liberty and national security. 
A. U.K. Terrorism Act 2000: Fighting Religious Terrorism 
The most important European legal provision affecting religion 
is the U.K. Terrorism Act 2000 (“the Act”), which proscribes 
terrorist groups. 
The Act defines terrorism as “the use or threat of action . . . 
designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or 
a section of the public . . . and . . . made for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause.”25 An action falls 
within the scope of the Act if it  
(a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious 
damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that 
of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to 
the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is 
designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system.26
Listing religion as a motivation for terrorism was uncommon in 
previous European antiterrorism legal provisions, although a 
reference to “religious fanaticism” as a motivation for terrorism 
appeared in the 1997 E.U. Resolution on Combating Terrorism in 
the European Union.27 Following the example of the U.N. 
 25. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1(1) (Eng.) (emphasis added).  
 26. Id. § 1(2). 
 27. See Nicola Vennemann, Country Report on the European Union, in TERRORISM AS A 
CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, pt. III, § 1 (Christian Walter et al. 
eds., 2003) [hereinafter TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE] (proceedings of the conference 
organized by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 
Heidelberg, Jan. 24−25, 2003). For the text of the resolution entitled Combating Terrorism in 
the European Union, which was adopted January 30, 1997, see http://www3.europarl. 
eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/calendar?APP=PDF&TYPE=PV2&FILE=19970130EN.pdf&LAN
GUE=EN (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). The same reference to religious fanaticism is included 
in the Recommendation on the role of the European Union in combating terrorism adopted 
by the European Parliament on September 5, 2001. See the above URL address for the text. 
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Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,28 
terrorism was usually defined in connection with “political 
purposes,” and religion was only mentioned as a force that could 
never justify terrorism. However, the new, modified definition of 
terrorism in the U.K. Terrorism Act, which identifies religion as a 
possible motivation for terrorism and which is followed by laws 
approved in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,29 means the 
lawmaker knows that terrorism can be inspired by religion and he 
will no longer grant religious organizations a presumption of 
innocence.30
The U.K. Terrorism Act is a complex piece of legislation and 
requires a more extensive examination than it is possible to provide 
in this Article. This Article is limited to two observations: the Act’s 
 28. G.A. Res. 60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 
(1994), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm. Section I, 
paragraph 3 of the Declaration states that  
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any 
circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to 
justify them. 
The Declaration was approved with U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/49/60 
on December 9, 1994. See also the definition of terrorism in Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/51/210 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ 
a51r210.htm.  
For an extensive discussion on the definition of terrorism, see NATHAN HANCOCK, 
TERRORISM AND THE LAW IN AUSTRALIA: LEGISLATION, COMMENTARY AND CONSTRAINTS 
(Parl. of Austl., Research Paper No. 12, 2001–2002), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/ 
library/pubs/rp/2001-02/02rp12.htm; NATHAN HANCOCK, TERRORISM AND THE LAW IN 
AUSTRALIA: SUPPORTING MATERIALS (Parl. of Austl., Research Paper No. 13, 2001–2002), 
available at www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2001-02/02rp13.htm. 
 29. See the definition of terrorist activities in Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 100.1 
(Austl.), as modified by Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill, 2002 (Austl.); 
CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 83.01(1)(b) (1985) (Can.), as modified by Anti-
terrorism Act, ch. 41 (2001) (Can.), http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/A-11.7/1860.html. For an 
analysis of this act, see Markus Wagner, Country Report on Canada, in TERRORISM AS A 
CHALLENGE, supra note 27, at 1; Terrorism Suppression Act, No. 34, pt. 1, § 5 (2002) 
(N.Z.). For an analysis of this law, see JOHN E. SMITH, NEW ZEALAND’S ANTI-TERRORISM 
CAMPAIGN: BALANCING CIVIL LIBERTIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES (2003), available at http://www.fulbright.org.nz/voices/axford/docs/ 
smithj.pdf. 
 30. The previous definition of terrorism did not mention religion. See Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, § 20(1) (Eng.). 
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definition of terrorism and the power it grants to proscribe religious 
organizations. 
1. The Act’s definition of terrorism is too broad 
The Act’s definition of terrorism is very broad31 and invites 
dangerously broad interpretations. This is best illustrated by an 
example. Let us imagine that, at the time of the Salman Rushdie 
affair, Muslims opposing the protection granted Rushdie by the 
government of the United Kingdom disrupted the electronic mail 
system of a government office by sending a large number of 
protesting e-mails. Today this action could be considered a terrorist 
act. We can therefore agree with those people who fear that the law 
will criminalize expressions of dissent and who request inclusion of 
some clauses, along the lines of those appearing in the Canadian Bill, 
to prevent this risk.32
In spite of its broad definition of terrorism, the U.K. Terrorism 
Act is founded on a sound principle: resorting to violence to advance 
a religious cause is never legitimate. This is a minimal statement, but 
it identifies the border dividing what is acceptable and what is not, it 
applies to believers of any religion, and it creates a platform on which 
it is possible to build a large consensus. 
2. The Act gives a government the discretionary power to proscribe 
terrorist organizations 
The second observation about the U.K. Terrorism Act regards 
the British Secretary of State’s discretionary power to proscribe a 
terrorist organization. According to the Act, once he is convinced an 
organization is involved in terrorism, the Secretary of State may by 
order proscribe it without a court decision.33 Although it is difficult 
 31. However, they are not as broad as those contained in the U.S. Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, approved on January 23, 2002. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, § 2(15), 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 32. The Canadian Act, see supra note 29, explicitly exempts from the definition of 
terrorism those acts that cause “serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential 
service, facility or system” but are “a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work 
that is not intended” to endanger the life, health, or safety of persons. See CRIMINAL CODE, 
R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) (1985) (Can.).  
 33. Terrorism Act, 2000, § 3(4) (Eng.). According to the Act, “an organisation is 
concerned in terrorism if it (a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for 
terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.” 
Id. § 3(5).  
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to object to action against terrorist organizations, we must 
remember that proscribing a religious organization involved in 
terrorist activity can interfere with the free practice of that religion by 
its guiltless members. Consider the case where the proscribed 
organization “is the sole organisation legitimised within the religious 
system” and cannot be replaced by another.34 In this case, it is 
reasonable to require that “organisations that are the sole vehicles of 
a particular belief system should be subject to especial scrutiny before 
proscription is permitted.”35
B. Banning Extremist Religions in Russia and Germany 
Russia has focused on ways to combat religious extremism. The 
2002 federal law On Counteracting Extremist Activity36 forbids “the 
founding and activity of [a] public organisation[] whose goals or 
actions are aimed at carrying out extremist” activities.37 The statute 
defines the following activities as extremist activities: (1) inciting 
religious enmity and propagandizing exclusivity, and (2) superiority 
or inferiority of citizens on account of their attitude towards 
religion.38 Article 15 of the Russian law establishes that an extremist 
statement made in public by a leader of an organization that is not 
denounced by the organization, as well as the conviction of one of 
its leaders for extremist activities, may be evidence of extremism in 
the entire organization.39 Article 15 further adds that extremist 
activity carried out by a subdivision of an organization exposes the 
entire organization to prosecution.40
Extremist religious associations have also been banned in 
Germany. In December 2001, the law on associations was amended 
and the religions privilege⎯that is, the prohibition on banning 
 34. PETER EDGE, LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE 120−21 (2002). 
 35. Id. 
 36. On Counteracting Extremist Activity, Fed. Law No. 114-FZ (July 25, 2002), Sobr. 
Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 30, Item 3031. For a general overview of this law, see J. Brian Gross, 
Comment, Russia’s War on Political and Religious Extremism, 2003 BYU L. REV. 717.  
 37. See Togran B. Beknazar, Country Report on Russia, pt. III § 7.a, in TERRORISM AS A 
CHALLENGE, supra note 27, at 16 (citing art. 9 of the law). 
 38. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 36, at 728 (noting that the Russian law prohibits 
organizations from propagandizing exclusion or advocating supremacy or inferiority based on 
factors such as religion or race).  
 39. E.g., id. at 725 (providing an overview of a provision in Article 15 of the Russian 
law). 
 40. See Beknazar, supra note 37, at 18. 
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religious associations⎯was abolished.41 As a consequence, the 
German government can now ban religious associations whose 
objectives or activities conflict with the criminal laws or that oppose 
the constitutional order or the concept of international 
understanding. In fact, a few days after this legislative change, the 
German government banned an association called the Kalifstaat on 
the grounds of internal state security. 
Although the significance of the new German provision is largely 
symbolic,42 it conveys a clear message: the lawmaker regards religious 
extremism as the first step toward religious terrorism and will no 
longer grant immunity to extremist religious doctrines. 
These provisions illustrate the growing tendency to punish an 
entire organization for the crimes committed by some of its 
members, and they also repeat a pattern that can be found in many 
antiterrorism laws.43 These provisions inevitably extend to innocent 
people the prosecution and repression that should be reserved for the 
crimes of some extremists. 
Fighting religious extremism is not the same as fighting religious 
terrorism. While the latter consists of actions and facts, religious 
extremism focuses on ideas and teachings. These ideas may be 
dangerous ones that could help develop terrorism, but when we are 
in the realm of ideas (and not of facts) a more careful and restrained 
approach is required. 
C. Statutes Repressing Religious Hatred 
Not only have states taken steps to prevent religious terrorism, 
but they have also legislated against religious conflict. State officials 
 41. See Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Vereinsgesetzes [Amendment to the Law of 
Associations] v. 12.4.2001 (BGBl. I S.3319). About this law, see Kathrin Groh, Das 
Religionsprivileg des Vereinsgesetzes, 85 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR 
GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 39 (2002); Ralf Poscher, Vereinsverbote gegen 
Religionsgemeinschaften?, 85 KRITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 298 (2002); Markus Rau, Country Report on Germany, pt. III § 1, in 
TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE, supra note 27, at 1. 
 42. Before the new German law was passed, it was possible to ban religious associations 
performing activities in conflict with criminal law or the constitutional order. 
 43. See the remarks devoted to the U.K. Terrorism Act of 2000, supra Part III.A. But 
the trend is not confined to antiterrorism laws. Another example is the antisects law recently 
approved in France. Law No. 2001-504 of June 12, 2001, J.O., June 13, 2001, p. 9337. The 
law makes possible the dissolution of a sectarian association when its leaders have been 
condemned for violation of the criminal legislation.  
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in charge of national security increasingly focus on interreligious 
confrontations and conflicts, because these disputes degenerate into 
violence more frequently than they had in the past. Preventing 
religious strife is considered an effective way of enhancing security. 
For this reason, many states now pay more attention to their 
obligations under Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)44 and have enacted new laws that 
repress religious hatred. For example, the United Kingdom Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 extends the provisions 
concerning incitement of racial hatred to also include religious 
hatred.45
There is some criticism of these new provisions.46 Similar laws 
have been approved in other Western European states47 and their 
enforcement has not created particular problems. However, events 
that have occurred elsewhere, especially in the central Asian 
countries, indicate that enforcing religious tolerance through state 
laws can be dangerous. It is not difficult for us to imagine a 
malevolent state official picking an appropriate passage of the Bible 
or the Qur’an and then construing it as condoning religious strife or 
violence. 
Religious organizations could repress religious hatred more 
effectively than the states. Religious organizations could develop 
codes of religious harmony48 or common guidelines that are then 
 44. “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 
52, art. 20(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].  
 45. Moreover, the Act extends the racially aggravated offenses of assault, public order, 
criminal damage, and harassment to cover attacks aggravated by religious hostility. See 2 OPEN 
SOCIETY INSTITUTE, The Situation of Muslims in the UK, in MONITORING THE EU 
ACCESSION PROCESS: MINORITY PROTECTION 406−09 (2002).  
 46. See Ralph Smyth, The Real State of Emergency: Is the UK About to be Turned into a 
Police State?, pt. 5 (Nov. 22, 2001), at http://www.urban75.com/Action/terror2001.html. 
 47. For an example in Italy, see Misure urgenti in materia di discriminazione razziale, 
etnica e religiosa, Gazz. Uff., June 26, 1993, n.205, Le Leggi 205/1993, June 25, 1993 
(Italy). For an example in Spain, see Ley Organica 8/1983 (B.O.E., 1983, 152), arts. 137, 
165 (Spain). For an example in Portugal, see CRIMINAL CODE art. 240 (Port.).  
 48. For an example, see the religious harmony declaration prepared by the religious 
authorities of Singapore, following an invitation by the Singapore Prime Minister. For the text 
and some comments, see DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS HARMONY, at http://www.seuteck. 
org/religiousharmonyenglish.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003); Declaration of Religious 
Harmony Becomes Part of Singapore Life, RADIO SING. INT’L NEWSLINE (June 10, 2003), at 
http://archive.rsi.com.sg/en/programmes/newsline/2003/06/10_06_01.htm; Religious 
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applied to controversial issues.49 Currently, too few of these codes 
and guidelines exist, and they are not always effective. But fighting 
religious hatred is primarily the responsibility of religious 
communities. If religious organizations are unwilling or unable to 
fight religious hatred, states take the problem into their own hands, 
although the states’ approach inevitably focuses on political rather 
than religious interests,50 which could result in further repression of 
religion.51
D. Construing National Security as a  
Legitimate Limitation to Religious Liberty 
National security is not identified as a legitimate limitation to 
religious practice in the international covenants,52 nor is it identified 
as a limitation in most European constitutions.53 However, because 
of the increase in religiously motivated terrorism, we can expect 
Harmony Declaration Calls for Greater Social Cohesion Among Singaporeans (June 11, 2003), 
at http://www.hrwf.net/html/singapore_2003.html.  
 49. Proselytism is an example of this. See the guiding principles listed in Bert Beach, 
Proselytism in the Context of Globalization, Religious Liberty and Non-Discrimination, 2001 
FIDES ET LIBERTAS 85, 85−87.  
 50. The definition of “religion” and “religious” is of crucial importance in deciding 
whether a group is entitled to protection. The state would have the power to refuse protection 
to a group by denying its religious character. The topic has been raised, with reference to 
Scientology, in connection with the United Kingdom Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
of 2001. See BRIEFING ON THE ANTI-TERRORISM CRIME AND SECURITY BILL, HOUSE OF 
LORDS SECOND READING 13−16 (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.justice.org.uk/ 
images/pdfs/anti-terrorismbill.pdf. 
 51. An example of these dangers is the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act enacted 
in Singapore in 1990, ch. 167A, available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/html/ 
homepage.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003). In order to protect religious harmony, the Act 
gives the state authorities the power to issue a restraining order against any religious 
representative who excites “disaffection against the President or the Government while, or 
under the guise of, propagating or practising any religious belief.” Id. art. 8(1)(d). The order 
can restrain the religious representative from addressing a congregation or publishing any text 
without the prior permission of the state authorities. Id. art. 8(2).  
 52. See ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 18(3); European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9(2), E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 
222 [hereinafter ECHR]. The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations explicitly 
excluded invoking national security as a legitimate limit to Article 18. See U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., Gen. Comment No. 22(48) ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993).  
 53. Poland is the only member state of the European Union to list national security 
among the limitations to religious freedom. POL. CONST. art. 53.  
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political pressure on states to include national security among the 
legitimate limitations to religious practice.54
To assess the impact of national security as a limitation on 
religious liberty, we must consider the meaning, scope, and aim of 
the national security clause of the ICCPR.55 According to the 
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in 
the ICCPR, “[n]ational security may be invoked to justify measures 
limiting certain rights only when they are taken to protect the 
existence of the nation, its territorial integrity or political 
independence against force or threat of force.”56
Until now, international court case law on national security has 
dealt only with secular matters,57 but some issues certainly have a 
religious profile. For example, imagine that a religious authority, 
basing his statements on the sacred books of his religion, asks part of 
the population of a country to secede because that population is not 
entitled to live according to its religious law, or urges soldiers 
professing a particular religion to desert so they are not obliged to 
fight against soldiers belonging to the same religion but residing in a 
 54. The new Bulgarian law on religions, approved on December 20, 2002, already lists 
national security among the limitations of religious freedom. See Law on Religions, art. 7 
(2002) (Bulg.). 
 55. See ICCPR, supra note 44, arts. 19(2), (3b) (regarding freedom of expression); 
ECHR, supra note 52, art. 10(2) (regarding freedom of expression); see also ECHR, supra 
note 52, art. 11(2) (regarding freedom of assembly and association); ICCPR, supra note 44, 
arts. 21, 22(2) (regarding freedom of assembly and association). 
 56. U.N. ESCOR Comm’n on Human Rights, 41st Sess., Annex ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985), available at http://www.article23.org.hk/english/research/ 
ICCPR.doc. The Siracusa definition of national security is specified in the Johannesburg 
Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. According 
to principle 2(a),  
[a] restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not 
legitimate unless its genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect a 
country’s existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, or its 
capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether from an external source, 
such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to violent 
overthrow of the government.  
Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information 2(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39 (1995) [hereinafter Johannesburg Princs.], 
available at http://www.article19.org.docimages/511.htm. 
 57. Secular matters regarding security have involved disclosure of classified secrets, 
prohibition of reporting interviews with representatives of proscribed political organizations, 
banning of associations because of their totalitarian program, and so on. See MARK W. JANIS ET 
AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 185−89 (2000); JACQUES VELU & RUSEN ERGEC, LA 
CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROIT DE L’HOMME, BRUXELLES, BRUYLANT 618−19, 
657−59 (1990). 
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different state, or demands that a “holy” war be waged against 
another state. These examples illustrate how national security can be 
affected by religion, and they illustrate how any attempt to curb such 
actions on the part of a religious leader could interfere with religious 
freedom. 
Articles 18(3) of the ICCPR and 9(2) of the ECHR may already 
provide some grounds for restricting these manifestations of 
religion,58 but they do not address this hypothetical, religiously 
motivated behavior, which clearly endangers national security. As 
episodes of this kind become more frequent, it would not be 
unreasonable to include national security among the limitations on 
religious liberty, provided the limitation is framed in a way that 
minimizes the risk of unjustly restricting the right to practice 
religion. However, in many countries where religious liberty is 
limited in the name of national security⎯for example, 
Uzbekistan59⎯this limitation on religious liberty has been exploited 
to establish regimes where legitimate and peaceful religious 
communities have been denied religious liberty.60
While the usual safeguards ensuring the legitimacy of laws 
limiting religion must be met⎯that is, any restriction should be 
prescribed by law, aimed at protecting a legitimate national security 
interest, and necessary in a democratic society⎯the main guarantee 
that national security is not abused resides in establishing a definite 
link between repressible manifestations of religion and violence:61 
 58. On the point whether the examples made in the previous paragraph can be regarded 
as manifestations of religion, see MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 304−14 (1997).  
 59. See Grant Garrard Beckwith, Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious Liberty, 
2000 BYU L. REV. 997, 997−1039. Article 3 of this law states that “[t]he freedom of worship 
or any other conviction are [sic] subject only to the restrictions necessary to ensure national 
security and public order, and life, health, morals, rights and freedoms of other citizens.” Id. at 
1040–41. Article 5 further expounds on this issue by declaring “[t]he use of religion for anti-
state and anti-constitutional propaganda, and to incite hostility, hatred, inter-ethnic discord, to 
undermine ethical norms and civil accord, to spread libelous, and destabilizing ideas, to create 
panic among the people and for other actions against the state, society and individual is 
inadmissible.” Id. at 1042. Such vaguely worded and dangerously general legal provisions are 
not restricted to Uzbekistan but are common to other central Asian states.  
 60. See UN News, Anti-terrorism Used as an Excuse to Clamp Down on Religion – UN 
Report (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.hrwf.net/html/un_2003.html (stating that the attacks 
of September 11 have become “an excuse for a crackdown on religion”). 
 61. For more information, see Lee Boothby, International Law Principles Applied to 
National Security and Religious Expression: A Report, Some Observations and Suggestions, 2003  
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manifestations of religion may be repressed only if they are intended 
to and are likely to incite imminent violence.62 This guarantee should 
list a number of religious manifestations that are explicitly protected 
and that cannot be restricted on grounds of national security. 
Examples of religious manifestations that should be listed as 
protected include any manifestation that (a) “constitutes objection, 
or advocacy of objection, on grounds of religion, conscience or 
belief, to military conscription or service, a particular conflict, or the 
threat or use of force to settle international disputes”;63 (b) “is 
directed at communicat[ing] information about alleged violations of 
international human rights standards or international humanitarian 
law”;64 (c) “advocates non-violent change of government policy or 
the government itself”; or (d) “constitutes criticism of, or insult to, 
the nation, the state or its symbols, the government, its agencies, or 
public officials . . . or a foreign nation, state or its symbols, 
government, agencies or public officials, unless the criticism or insult 
was intended and likely to incite imminent violence.”65 A provision 
including these limits might satisfy the need for more national 
security and minimize the restriction of religious freedom. 
If national security is further threatened⎯as a consequence of a 
war, for example⎯then other more radical measures may be taken. 
Depending on the situation, such measures might include stricter 
control over places of worship66 and foreign religious personnel;67 
FIDES ET LIBERTAS 36. Boothby explores the possibility of applying the Johannesburg 
Principles to religious expressions and manifestations.  
 62. The formulation proposed by Boothby is  
Religious manifestation may be punished as a threat to national security only if a 
government can demonstrate that:  
(1) The manifestation is intended to incite imminent violence;  
(2) It is likely to incite such violence; and  
(3) There is a direct and immediate connection between the religious manifestation 
and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence.  
Id. at 40.  
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Johannesburg Princs., supra note 56, at princs. 7(a)(i), 7(a)(ii), 7(b); Boothby, 
supra note 61, at 38 (paraphrasing the Johannesburg Principles in the context of religious 
manifestation).  
 66. Places of worship enjoy a particularly strong protection in the legal systems of many 
European states. In Italy, for example, police cannot enter a church unless a crime is being 
committed. See Legge 25 marzo 1985, n.121, Ratifica ed esecuzione dell’Accordo, con 
protocollo addizionale, firmato a Roma il 18 febbraio 1984, che apporta modificazioni al 
Concordato lateranense dell’11 febbraio 1929, tra la Repubblica Italiana e la S. Sede (Law of 
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exceptions to the respect of religious privacy,68 including the 
religious secret;69 and tightening the registration procedure of 
religious organizations, particularly those that have their 
headquarters abroad. In the worst cases, even the right to change 
religion could be affected.70
March 25, 1985), art. 5, in Supplemento ordinario alla Gazz. Uff., April 10, 1985. In any 
other case, the religious authority in charge of the church must be notified in advance. After 
September 11, these restrictions on police control of places of worship (and particularly 
mosques) might easily be lifted. Recently the military advisor of the Italian Prime Minister has 
suggested closing down the mosques where Muslim religious authorities incite religious hate. 
See Sarzanini Fiorenza, Meno diritti per combattere il terrorismo, IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 
Dec. 4, 2003, at 5. For a non-European example, see Emad Mekay, 88,000 Mosques, One 
Sermon (July 28, 2003), at http://www.hrwf.net/html/egypt_2003.html# 
mosquesonesermon (describing state censorship of sermons delivered in Egyptian mosques). 
 67. In the Netherlands, for example, new imams are required to attend compulsory 
classes where they are given courses on topics like freedom of speech and religion, non-
discrimination, women’s rights, homosexuality, and so on. If they refuse, they will not get a 
residence permit. See Andrew Osborn, Muslims Told to Speak Dutch in Mosques (Oct. 2, 2002), 
at http://www.hrwf.net/html/netherlands2002.htm.  
 68. In consideration of the increasingly significant link between terrorism and religion, 
knowing the religious affiliation of a person, particularly if he or she is an immigrant, could be 
considered a legitimate interest of security officers. A proposal in this sense was made by the 
Ministry of Interior of the German Land of Bavaria: immigrants should declare their religion 
when they enter a country and this information should be fed into a central database. See the 
interview given to Lindner Claudio, Beckstein, lo “sceriffo” della Baviera: “Copierò le norme 
italiane sulle impronte,” IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Sept. 21, 2002. 
 69. The protection traditionally enjoyed by the attorney-client relationship was one of 
the first casualties of the post−September 11 regulations enacted in the United States. See 
David W. Hendon & Lee Canipe, Notes on Church-State Affairs, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 383, 
395−96 (2002). The erosion of the right to privacy could also affect the confidentiality of the 
religious minister-member relationship. This confidentiality is strongly protected by the laws of 
many European states. See, e.g., James Casey, State and Church in Ireland, in STATE AND 
CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 147, 165 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1996); Richard Potz, 
State and Church in Austria, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra, at 
229, 254; Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in Germany, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, supra, at 57, 71. Similar provisions are in force in Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
etc., but the confidentiality of the minister-member relationship was recently weakened by 
some court decisions (notably in France) connected to cases of pedophilia involving religious 
ministers. See Olivier Echappé, Le secret en question, in XLIII L’ANNÉE CANONIQUE 285−300 
(2001) (regarding the Court of Caen decision of September 2, 2001). The issue of pedophilia 
was perceived as so sensitive that the religious or professional secret was not regarded as a 
sufficient exemption from the obligation to report a crime. A similar result could occur when 
equally sensitive issues⎯security, for example⎯are at stake.  
 70. Recently, the most important Italian newspaper gave prominence to an article 
stressing that conversions to Islam frequently contain “an implicit or explicit refusal of the 
liberal civilization of the West.” Angelo Panebianco, I crociati al contrario [It Crosses You to the 
Contrary], IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Aug. 19, 2002, at 71 (author’s translation). Therefore, 
these conversions cannot be considered exclusively in a religious perspective, as they have 
relevant political implications. The article does not draw the conclusions that logically descend 
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Enacting laws such as these would shift the balance between 
religious liberty and national security and would affect church-state 
relations even more deeply than the limited measures that have been 
taken. Yet, as significant as the effect of September 11 has been on 
new legislation, the events of September 11 affect the balance 
between religious liberty and national security at another, more 
indirect but more extensive level. Part IV explores this topic. 
IV. LONG-TERM IMPACT ON CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
The effects of the events of September 11 will extend beyond 
enacting the new legal provisions this Article examined in Part III. 
The new balance between security and freedom will affect basic 
principles that define the place religion has had in European society. 
It is unlikely that the September 11 events will be strong enough to 
significantly change the fundamental features of the European system 
of church-state relations, but they may provide an impetus to already 
ongoing processes that particularly concern the separation of church 
and state and the notion of traditional religion. 
A. Lowering the Wall of Separation Between Church and State 
In Europe, the wall of separation between church and state 
began lowering many years ago, but the need for greater national 
security may accelerate this trend. 
Separation of church and state is based on the idea that the state 
is not competent to intervene in religious matters. Terrorist groups’ 
recourse to religion will make people question the idea that the state 
is not competent to intervene in religious affairs. Religions are no 
longer “beyond the cognizance” of civil government, as James 
Madison once said.71 The civil government has a legitimate interest 
from this statement, but this line of reasoning paves the way to the introduction of some 
limitations to the freedom of conversion on the model of the laws already existing in some 
Middle East and Asian countries. On this topic, see supra note 19. For some recent 
developments in this field, see Gujarat to Ban Faith Conversion (Feb. 25, 2003), at 
http://www.hrwf.net/html/india_2003.html#GujaraHoban; see also Joshua Newton, India 
Prepares National “Anti-conversion Rule,” (Sep. 15, 2003), at http://www.hrwf.net/ 
html/india_2003.html#Indiapreparesnationalanticonversion. 
 71. Derek H. Davis, Editorial: The Dark Side to a Just War: The USA PATRIOT Act 
and Counterterrorism’s Potential Threat to Religious Freedom, 44 J. CHURCH & ST. 5 (2002). 
Davis adds that “[t]he PATRIOT Act . . . could have the harmful result of striking down the 
veil that has obscured religious belief and, to a lesser extent, religious practice from the 
cognizance of governmental authority.” Id. at 8.  
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in what religions affirm and practice.72 More importantly, the state 
may intervene to prevent religions from being turned into 
instruments of violence. Religions have lost their innocence:73 they 
no longer live in a Garden of Eden. They need to prove they can 
benefit civil society or at least prove they are harmless. 
Lowering the wall separating church and state will affect majority 
and minority religions in Europe in different ways. Minority 
religions,74 particularly those whose tenets question the secular 
character of the state, the respect of its symbols, and so on, can 
expect an increase in state control and in interference with their 
practice and possibly their belief.75 As a result of September 11, Islam 
will be scrutinized most heavily by the state, but other minority 
religious groups may also be affected. Governments may be tempted 
to exploit the national security issue in order to control not only 
violent and dangerous religious groups, but also “unpopular” 
religious communities, that is, groups that believe and behave in a 
way that is inconsistent with the principles and practices of the 
majority of citizens. If this attitude prevails, security concerns will 
legitimize the increasing mistrust of some religious minorities in 
Europe, both in the West (laws regarding “new” religious 
movements are a good example of this) and in the East (for example, 
 72. See Robert A. Seiple, Religious Liberty on the Global Stage, Address Delivered at 
the Spirit of Liberty Symposium (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www. 
globalengagement.org/issues/2001/11/rseiple-philly.htm (“[W]e need to know our enemy. 
Our enemy claims to be working from a religious base. We need to know the values of that 
enemy in order to defeat him, to understand his motivation for what he has done and, most 
importantly, what he might be planning to do next.”).  
 73. The lost innocence of religions is not something absolutely new. The Aum 
Shinrikyo gas attack on the Tokyo subway or the mass suicide of the Solar Temple followers, 
and so on, had alerted public opinion to the existence of dangerous or destructive sects. 
However, these events involved small and borderline groups (the term “sect” found in popular 
language concerning these groups shows they were not regarded as “true” religions). What is 
new about the September 11 events is that they involved Islam, the second largest religion in 
the world. On the difference between the violence coming from groups that are or are not part 
of a historical tradition, see Jean-François Mayer, Violence et nouveaux mouvements religieux: 
quelles leçons pouvons-nous tirer? (Aug. 22, 2002), at http://www.terrorisme.net/ 
analyse/2002/005_nrm.htm. 
 74. It is not easy to identify “minority religions” because each religion is a minority 
religion somewhere in Europe. What makes the difference is that some religions (such as Islam, 
Judaism, and the so-called “new” religious movements) are minority religions practically 
everywhere; other religions (Roman Catholicism or Russian Orthodoxy, for instance) are 
minority religions in some countries but are the majority religion in others. 
 75. On the forms this control could assume, see supra Part III. 
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the treatment of non-Orthodox religions in Russia). Models for 
more restrictive legislation may be provided either by the French law 
on “sects”76 or by the legal provisions in some post-Communist 
European countries.77 The second option is more likely to occur, due 
to the enlargement of the European Union by adding a number of 
these countries in 2004. Thus harmonizing different legal systems 
may strike a balance between Western and Eastern European 
standards on religious liberty and equal treatment of religious 
groups, raising the Eastern standards but lowering the Western 
ones.78 But whichever option prevails, this process of using national 
security concerns to control religious groups may abuse national 
security, using it to stop religious practices that have little to do with 
religiously motivated violence. 
Ensuring separation of church and state is more complicated 
when we consider majority religions. In Europe, the fear of terrorism 
joins up with the fear of immigration, and particularly of Muslim 
immigration. The growing presence of immigrants from Asia and 
Africa has spread the conviction that Europe is on the point of losing 
its identity, of being transformed into a multicultural continent 
without a soul. An increasing number of people think that security 
cannot be effectively granted without social cohesion and a strong 
collective identity. Christian churches, as a central part of the 
European identity, will be called on more and more to help preserve 
the European cultural heritage and to provide the principles and 
values for building some kind of European “civil religion”⎯that is, a 
set of values shared by a large segment of Europeans and that unites 
believers and nonbelievers, Catholics as well as Protestants and 
Orthodox, and so on.79
 76. Law No. 2001-504 of June 12, 2001, J.O., June 13, 2001, p. 9337. 
 77. See generally LAW AND RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE, supra note 14. 
 78. At a much deeper level, the problem the European Union will have to face is 
striking a balance between the conception of religious liberty prevailing in the Orthodox 
Church on the one hand and in the Catholic and Protestant churches on the other. According 
to Grace Davie and other scholars, this difference is only the emerging part of a much larger 
division that is deeply rooted in history. See GRACE DAVIE, RELIGION IN MODERN EUROPE: A 
MEMORY MUTATES 3−4 (2000); see also Lawrence Uzzell, Russians and Catholics, FIRST 
THINGS, Oct. 2002, at 21 (examining religious divisions in Russia).  
 79. See DAVIE, supra note 78, at 193−94. Davie stresses that the European Union 
cannot progress from a merely economic to a complex sociopolitical entity without some kind 
of European civil religion taking shape. 
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It is dangerous to associate Christianity with the European 
heritage. One may wonder how non-Christian religions⎯and 
particularly Islam⎯can help shape the European civil religion. 
Muslims’ contribution will likely be marginal at the beginning. This 
might exacerbate the Muslims’ feeling of exclusion, raising precisely 
the security problems that should be avoided. Thus, civil religion 
may be either truly inclusive and play a cohesive role or divisive and 
create new divisions. 
Let us take the issue of the crucifix in classrooms as an example 
of the potential problems associated with a civil religion.80 
Supporting the presence of the crucifix in classrooms as a symbol of 
European identity and culture could easily convey the idea that non-
Christians are not fully part of European history and tradition and 
have no place in today’s Europe. The issue would separate not only 
the faithful of different religions but also citizens, separating those 
who are “real” Europeans from those who, their opponents would 
contend, do not share the European soul. Such a division would 
make it more difficult to conceive of the European Union as a 
common house where everybody can feel at home irrespective of his 
or her religious convictions.  
These same remarks regarding placement of the crucifix in 
classrooms could be repeated regarding the proposal to mention the 
Christian roots of Europe in the future constitution of the European 
Union.81
 80. The question of the crucifix in the classrooms was discussed in Switzerland. See 
Vincenzo Pacillo, Decisioni elvetiche in tema di crocifisso e velo islamico nella scuola pubblica: 
spunti di comparazione, 110 IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO 210−29 (1999). The question of the 
crucifix in the classroom was also discussed in Germany after the decision of the Constitutional 
Court of May 16, 1995. See Joseph Listl, The Development of Civil Ecclesiastical Law in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 1995/1996, 3 EUR. J. FOR CHURCH & ST. RES. 11, 13−14 
(1996); see also Jörg Müller-Vollbehr, Positive und Negative Religionsfreiheit, 20 
JURISTENZEITUNG 996 (1995). And now it is debated in Italy. See ANDREA GUAZZAROTTI, 
GIUDICI E MINORANZE RELIGIOSE 237−41 (2001).  
 81. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, supra note 10; see also Constant Brand, EU 
Constitutional Convention Divided over Powers, Religion (Jan. 22, 2003), at 
http://www.hrwf.net/html/europe_2003.html; Vatican Finds “Gaps” in European 
Constitution Draft (Feb. 10, 2003), at http://www.hrwf.net/html/europe_2003. html.  
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B. Reinforcing the Distinction Between Traditional and 
Nontraditional Religions 
A second long-term consequence of September 11 could be that 
the European inclination to distinguish between traditional and 
nontraditional religions⎯that is, to distinguish between religions 
that are part of the historical, cultural, and social heritage of a 
country and religions that are not⎯is strengthened. 
Sometimes this distinction is openly expressed in legal provisions. 
In Lithuania, for example, Article 43 of the constitution separates 
traditional from nontraditional religions, and a law states which ones 
are placed in the first or in the second class.82 In Greece, Article 3 of 
the constitution proclaims that the Orthodox religion is the 
prevailing religion of the country.83 In addition, a number of 
northern European countries still have a state or a national church.84
Sometimes the distinction between traditional and nontraditional 
religions is not explicitly stated in a country’s legal provisions but it 
can easily be detected by analyzing the legal system of that country. 
For example, in Poland, Italy, Spain, and in other predominantly 
Catholic countries, the traditional character of Catholicism is seen in 
the concordats these countries have concluded with the Catholic 
Church. Although there are exceptions,85 concordats are almost 
always concluded with states where Catholicism is the traditional 
religion or at least, as in Germany, one of the traditional religions of 
the country. 
This rough description of the European system of church-state 
relations would require many more distinctions and nuances: a 
national church cannot be equated with a church that has concluded 
a concordat, nor can a dominant religion be confused with a 
traditional religion. But at least one point is clear: there are some 
 82. Law on Religious Communities and Associations, No. I-1057, arts. 5−6 (1995) 
(Lith.). 
 83. GREECE CONST. art. III(1), available at http://www.hri.org/MFA/ 
syntagma/artcl25.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (“The prevailing religion in Greece is that of 
the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ.”).  
 84. For more information regarding these systems of church-state relations and the 
reasons for their decline, see Ferrari, supra note 19.  
 85. Concordats have been concluded with countries where Catholicism is by no means 
traditional, as in Israel and Kazakhstan. See, e.g., F. Michael Perko, Toward a “Sound and 
Lasting Basis”: Relations Between the Holy See, the Zionist Movement, and Israel, 1896−1996, in 
2 ISRAEL STUDIES, No. 1, at http://www.iupjournals.org/israel/iss2-1.html (last visited Mar. 
5, 2004) (discussing the Fundamental Agreement of 1993 between Israel and the Vatican). 
FER-FIN 7/3/2004 1:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Summer 2004 
380 
 
religions that are not traditional religions anywhere in Europe. These 
nontraditional religions are Islam86 and the so-called “new” religious 
movements.87 Islam, however, as opposed to the “new” religions, 
has played a role in Europe that no “new” religious movement can 
even remotely claim. Nevertheless, Islam is not perceived, in today’s 
Europe, as a traditional religion. 
Islam and the “new” religious movements are the religions 
raising the most acute security worries. “Radical Islam” and 
“dangerous sects” are regarded as potentially troublesome groups. 
Nearly everybody will admit that not all Muslim communities are 
radical and not all “new” religious movements are dangerous, but 
when security is discussed in the media, Islam and the new religions 
are always mentioned in the newspapers and television talk shows. 
Drawing more distinctions between traditional and 
nontraditional religions may address security issues without isolating 
Islam or a specific “new” religious movement; isolating a religious 
movement, however, might be prohibited by international and 
constitutional provisions preventing states from discriminating 
among religions. For example, registration requirements for 
nontraditional religions could be more stringent than those for 
traditional religions. Screening the practices and doctrine of 
nontraditional religions could also become part of their registration 
procedure. A whole set of legal restrictions could easily be applied to 
nontraditional religious groups on the basis that they are foreign or 
not rooted in the history and tradition of a country. 
Two dangers are inherent in creating more stringent registration 
requirements for nontraditional religions, however. First, more 
stringent registration requirements for nontraditional religions would 
widen the gap between “first class” and “second class” religions. 
This gap must be narrowed, not widened, to achieve true religious 
liberty in Europe. If the gap between the state support offered to 
traditional and nontraditional religions is too wide, both equality and 
individual religious freedom suffer. Indeed there is a relationship 
between individual freedom and equality among religious groups: 
the greater the inequality between them, the greater the risk that the 
 86. Except in some parts of the Balkans and of Russia. 
 87. It could also be argued that Judaism is not a traditional religion in today’s Europe, 
but Judaism contributed considerably toward shaping the European identity through the 
medium of Christianity. References to the Judeo-Christian roots of Europe are frequent in the 
political language of the European institutions. 
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freedom of each member of a less-favored group will be limited.88 
Because individual religious liberty lies at the foundation of the 
relationship between law and religion in the West, this danger 
cannot be overlooked. 
Second, excessively differentiating between traditional and 
nontraditional religions would increase the distance that divides the 
legal systems prevailing in Europe and in the United States, where 
such a distinction is currently unknown. Greater distance between 
the two legal systems would in turn result in more friction and 
tension, similar to that which has already emerged in relation to 
French and German policy regarding “new” religious movements,89 
and would further weaken the Western model of the church-state 
relationship. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Religious violence may not be an ephemeral phenomenon. It has 
deep roots that go beyond the tensions dividing the Christian West 
and part of the Islamic world. Some scholars stress that we are living 
at a time of declining secular ideologies; religion is one of the 
motivating forces that is left, and, in a world devoid of other strong 
systems of belief, it is exploited to mobilize people for political 
objectives.90 Other scholars point to the growing fear that the West, 
and particularly the United States, is leading the world into 
onrushing economic, technological, and ecological forces that 
require uniform values. Thus, some people are tempted to “resort to 
religious identity to wage a total war against this universalism, to 
amplify their appeal and to obtain spiritual justification.”91 It will 
take a long time to remove these deep-seated causes of religious 
violence. 
 88. See Silvio Ferrari, Separation of Church and State in Contemporary European Society, 
30 J. CHURCH & ST. 533, 543−47 (1988).  
 89. See the reports on International Religious Freedom published annually by the U.S. 
Department of State. The latest issues are available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2004). 
 90. See Mayer, supra note 7. 
 91. Bob S. Hadiwinata, Terrorism, Religion and Global Politics (Dec. 6, 2002), at 
http://mail2.factsoft.de/pipermail/national/2002-December/011474.html. 
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Meanwhile we cannot sit and wait for a better time to come. 
Religious violence must be fought. So, what can be done? The task 
of the states and secular organizations is simple: they must emphasize 
the fact that religiously motivated violence is unacceptable. Of 
course, legal provisions embodying this message must draw careful 
distinctions as discussed in Part III of this Article. If careful 
distinctions are not made, then religion, instead of religious violence, 
and religious freedom, instead of religious extremism, may be 
criminalized. Such a result would damage precisely the security 
exigencies that must be protected. 
Once this message that religiously motivated violence is 
unacceptable has been conveyed, states and secular organizations 
have completed their task. As Lord Lloyd of Berwick observed, “It is 
an illusion to believe that the fanaticism and determination of well 
established terrorist organizations can be defeated by laws alone, 
even of the most severe and punitive kind. . . . [T]here is no 
legislative ‘fix’ or panacea against terrorism.”92 Thus, once states 
have done what they can to combat religiously motivated violence, 
religious communities and their leadership must complete the rest of 
the task. The religious communities’ difficult task requires them to 
interpret religious texts in a way that transcends the texts’ violence; 
requires them to carefully reconsider the dignity afforded the 
“other,” the nonfaithful or the faithful of another religion; and 
requires advocating a political theology that looks sympathetically to 
the secular character of the state and civil society. As John Paul II 
recently said, “Ecumenical dialogue between Christians and 
respectful contact with other religions, in particular with Islam, are 
the best remedy for sectarian rifts, fanaticism or religious 
terrorism.”93
There is no guarantee religious organizations will perform this 
task successfully, but there is no alternative. It would be unwise to 
rely solely on the states, which are not equipped to deal with 
religious violence beyond the limited task of granting public security 
and order and developing a social and political context favorable to 
religious tolerance.94 Religions must handle this huge responsibility; 
 92. Hancock, supra note 28, pt. 2.2.1.  
 93. Pope John Paul II, supra note 10, § 7.  
 94. A step in this direction has been taken by the Ministers of the Interior of the 
European Union member states who approved a common declaration on interreligious 
dialogue. Regarding this uncommon initiative, see EU: Interreligious Dialogue Against 
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it could be an opportunity for them to help shape the civil society of 
the third millennium or risk the possibility of their own 
marginalization. 
Terrorism, For Peace (Dec. 10, 2003), at http://www.ueitalia2003.it/EN/Notizie/ 
affariGeneraliRelazioniEsterne/Notizia_12101835404.htm.  
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